Ángela Forero-Aponte

If not every body matters, will we be able to attain peace? This was the question raised when Paola Uparela (assistant professor of Hispanic Literature), Maria Victoria Uribe (anthropologist and historian), and Juan Pablo Aranguren (psychologist) got together in FILBo 2025. 

What became very clear in an intense panel is that not every body matters in every context. This is particularly true in the armed conflict in Colombia, where, despite the many known atrocities, there are still more we have yet to hear of. There are too many cases where people, and their bodies, are neither respected nor dignified.

Maria Victoria Uribe has done extensive research on the harm inflicted on bodies and how it is part of war. Aranguren wrote Las Inscripciones de la Guerra en el Cuerpo de los Jóvenes Excombatientes, among many other publications; Uparela is a specialist in Colonial and Transatlantic Latin American cultural studies, gender, sexuality, and queer studies at the University of Florida.

Professor Uribe began by asking what the definition of peace is. “We all talk about peace,” she said, but “how do we define it?” Peace is not necessarily a concept; it is a desire – one that she points out is not universal.

Peace to people in Gaza might mean no more bombardments; the idea of peace for a Buddhist monk in Thailand may be something completely different. Peace is a desire, and when we talk about peace, we need to consider our understanding of the word. 

Professor Aranguren says we probably, wrongly, understand peace as the passage into a calm state after the war. But in the Colombian context, we need to consider the way war wounds and marks. The challenge when talking about peace is to analyse how war has been imbued in our daily lives.

We need to think about how war has been incorporated into a country with a long history of conflict. It isn’t only imprinted on those directly involved – whether victim or combatant — but also on those of us who are “comfortably” seated on a chair as mere spectators.

Professor Uparela says it is important to realize how the Spanish conquest of Latin America should not only be analysed from the context of the conquering of the territories, but from the conquest of those territories through the bodies. That encompasses the way conquerors rule, evangelize, and rape bodies.

It is also important to analyse the way written tools are used to own said bodies. A clear example is how the inhabitants of conquered regions were considered human only if they allowed evangelization; otherwise, they would automatically be considered savages, cannibals, and thus prone to slavery.

The experts talk about known and unknown cases where bodies have not mattered, and how this exposes why precisely they are used to strip others of their dignity. The most recent case, that of trans woman Sara Millerey, who was kidnapped and tortured, her body exposed on a river, and also filmed.

Tatiana Duplat, moderator of this talk, says people would rather film Sara than aid her. “What happens in an urban context, where there is – supposedly – peace? How was this body, her body, not treated with dignity, the dignity other bodies with power have?” asks Duplat.

Professor Uribe says she has hundreds, if not thousands, of examples. She talked about a 16-year-old in Neiva, a young man who worked in the centre of the city as a living statue. He was well-known by the inhabitants of Neiva, but he was captured by a group of men one day.

A few days later, his grandma, who had filed a missing person’s report, was told his body had been found. She wanted answers, and she was told he was a war casualty and that he was associated with a FARC front near San Agustín. 

His grandmother would not accept this – only a few days before, he had been doing his usual living statue work. Uribe says this is an all-too-common rationale soldiers in Colombia give for these deaths. This grandma’s claim is, surely, archived somewhere where nobody remembers this young man.

Uribe’s reflection: “The body of this young man, a young man who coincidentally worked with his body, was not dignified because of his being poor and anonymous. His grandma would not take it, and filed the report anyway.”

The panel presented a number of other unknown cases in detail, some of them cases of torture. In this last portion of the debate, the discussion revolved around the ins and outs of sharing these cases with the public.

Professor Aranguren ponders whether showing images such as Sara Millerey’s is necessary for people to know what happened to her body. Because posting the video also causes more suffering. Images are important to document violence  and collect evidence, but sometimes sharing those images can perpetuate more violence.

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The Catatumbo’s natural conditions have also endowed the land with some of the world’s most valuable natural resources. It contains the largest area of coca plantations on earth and is a major exporter of refined cocaine. The region also possesses vast petroleum and gold reserves and fertile conditions for palm oil plantations.

But as with many naturally rich areas of the world, resource abundance has cursed the people of the Catatumbo.

Since the 1990s, locals have been pawns in a conflict between guerrillas, paramilitaries, and government forces seeking to profit from the land. As a result, despite the abundant profits extracted from the region, its communities remain some of Colombia’s poorest.

A fresh wave of violence beginning in January has forced some 54,000 locals to leave their homes. Another 32,000 are confined to their houses, unable to leave due to the ongoing combat.

As with any conflict, young people are the worst affected. Some 47,000 children are unable to access education due to displacement or confinement.

Schools in the region are also often underfunded and undersupplied. 

Steve Hide, a former Head of Mission at Doctors Without Borders in Colombia, took it upon himself to organize an aid drive for a school in Tibú, a town at the center of the humanitarian crisis.

He collected donations from a network of locals and expats in Bogotá and Medellín, and coordinated a bulk purchase of school supplies from a stationary retailer in the capital.

“It’s very hard to know until you get there exactly what it’s going to be like and it’s all a bit of a guess but I think there’s also the element of showing a bit of solidarity with the people in there, they’ve suffered a lot over many years,” he says, behind the wheel of his red Mitsubishi Montero. 

The journey is not without its risks but Hide, who trains journalists to operate in hostile environments, is aware of what these are and how to minimize them.

“It’s a conflict area so you’re not guaranteed to be safe, it’s hard to know from the news exactly what’s happening, it’s hard to get good information but we do have a few contacts there that are encouraging us to come so we’re hoping it’s safe enough,” Hide explains.

He stresses the importance of not alarming locals, who may be informants for armed groups and who will be on high alert given the tensions in the region.

“You have to take it easy, you can’t rush in, you have to know people there, you have to make some contacts before you go and then when you get close to the conflict areas, go slow, take it easy, talk to people, stop along the way,” he explains.

As he’s telling me about the risks in the conflict zone, a truck overtakes our car at high speed just before a corner on the mountain road. 

“Crazy Colombian trucks, there you go, this guy’s going madly too fast down the hill, but he’s riding empty so he probably thinks he’s like a sports car,” Hide jokes.

He was once a truck driver himself, taking passengers on overland tours around the world, including a route from Colombia to Patagonia.

His unique set of logistical skills were suited to NGO work and set him up to get involved in the non-profit sector.

His time with Doctors Without Borders gave Hide access and insights into Colombia’s conflict zones. These included Tibú, where he met Jaime Botero, a community leader and the current President of the Association of Communal Action Boards (ASOJUNTAS). 

Arriving in Tibú, which is now home to some 13,000 people displaced by the recent clashes, Botero greets Steve like an old friend. 

The two catch up and discuss the situation in the Catatumbo, Botero’s project to expand a local school, and how best to coordinate the delivery of supplies.

We drive to the local school to deliver the boxes, where a team of volunteers helps to unpack the car.

The next day, Botero invites us to the school to meet the children who will receive the supplies.

They are particularly enchanted by the bright yellow English to Spanish dictionaries, gazing wide-eyed at the open boxes on their way to their classrooms.

In an assembly, Botero addresses around 300 students from Pre-K to third grade.

“I want to welcome Steve Hide, a great friend who has brought us important supplies from Bogotá,” says the community leader. 

But we cannot stay to see the students receive their supplies as Hide is keen to hit the road early out of an abundance of caution. 

After leaving the Catatumbo, we debrief on the mission over breakfast.

“I know no one’s pretending that we’ve made a huge impact. We haven’t. Maybe just for a few people. But it’s something. Something’s better than nothing,” Hide says between sips of a milky coffee.

He praises the work of NGOs in Tibú, several of which had contributed funds and materials to the expansion of the school we visited.

But Hide also suggested that, with the end of USAID and budget cuts to NGOs around the world, trips like these may be increasingly common. 

“The idea that you can get people together from a community, in this case friends and people we know in Bogota, raise a bit of money, buy some stuff, and actually deliver it directly to where the needs are, I think that’s kind of special as well,” says Hide.

Finally, I ask him whether he would describe the trip as “mission accomplished.”

“Yes, very much. I mean, we got there, we got back, still alive. Most important thing,” Hide jokes.

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A 72-hour ‘paro armado’, or armed strike, by the National Liberation Army (ELN) began at midnight today in Colombia’s western Chocó department.

The armed group declared the action, which threatens attacks on anyone leaving their homes, following weeks of clashes with the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC), or Gulf Clan, that have displaced 3,400 and confined at least 9,200.

While the ELN claims that the strike is meant to raise awareness of the humanitarian crisis in Chocó, government officials accuse it of using the action as a cover to create a drug-smuggling corridor.

The ELN’s Western War Front announced the action in a comuniqué on Saturday, criticizing the government for being allied with the AGC (also referred to as EGC) and failing to address the ongoing crisis in Chocó.

“To make visible the entanglement between the state, military forces and mercenaries, we declare a 72 hour armed strike in the Chocó department,” read the statement.

During the action, residents of affected areas will be forced to remain in their homes and face a threat of violence if they leave.

Andres Preciado, Director of Conflict and Security at Fundación Ideas para la Paz, explained the impact of these measures.

“The most worrisome [element] is the humanitarian situation due to mobility restrictions, where communities are prevented from accessing food and other rights,” the analyst told The Bogotá Post.

Preciado also noted that the ELN tends to resort to armed strikes when a new wave of hostilities begins with the EGC. 

The most recent bout of fighting between the ELN and EGC began on February 5 around Puerto Murillo, a remote town on the Río San Juan, which is a key cocaine smuggling route. 

Preciado notes that the EGC has made significant territorial gains this month and believes the ELN is using the strike to slow its advance.

The ELN acknowledges that there has been a “paramilitary advance”, and claims that the Gulf Clan is working in collaboration with the state. 

“We must unmask the plans of the oligarchy: the implementation of megaprojects, of their extractivist economic model and the massive arrival of mercenaries to protect their interest,” read the statement. 

Preciado explained that it is difficult to determine if state collusion with the EGC is “systematic” or “opportunistic.”

But the analyst maintained that the group’s expansion in Chocó goes much deeper than whether or not it has received state support. 

Although the violence in Chocó has reduced since early February, local authorities fear that new clashes could erupt at any moment.

Yesterday, the Ombudsman’s Office issued a warning about the deteriorating security situation in Colombia. 

In a statement, it identified 11 flashpoints across the country involving 10 armed groups and stressed that the conflict in Chocó was particularly concerning.

“One of the most critical situations can be found in the subregion of San Juan, Chocó,” read the communiqué. 

Speaking to W Radio, Iris Marín, Colombia’s Ombudsman, warned that members of the Estado Mayor Central, or Central General Staff, were in the Chocó for the first time.

The FARC dissident group is reportedly working alongside the EGC to fight the ELN.

The ELN staged a similar armed strike in November 2024 to reassert its control over the region and denounce state megaprojects. The strike lasted a week and forced some 50,000 people to remain in their homes.

Preciado believes that state security forces will not attempt to disrupt the strike.

“Once the strike is declared the damage has already been done, and the population is confined [to their homes] out of fear and a lack of confidence that the security forces can protect them,” said the analyst.

Feature image credit: Brasil de Fato via Flickr

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Recent years have seen football championships, international summits and election fever in Colombia. 2025 has none of that sort of event to provide a natural hook for the year to pivot around. However, there’s no shortage of things going on in the country. 2024 certainly had plenty going on.

Critically, 2026 has the possibility to be huge. There will be one of the most important elections in recent history next year to determine who succeeds Gustavo Petro as Colombian president, a World Cup in which la sele could well shine and much more besides.

Some of the preparation for that will bleed into this year, especially towards the end of 2025 in Colombia. In many ways much of what happens this year will end up affecting the following year and that opens up space for unexpected occurrences – something Colombia specialises in.

So, it’s an odd year that has ‘transition’ written all over it. But Colombia has a habit of springing surprises. With little on the agenda in the way of big events, it’s a hard year to call. Be sure to come back in a few months time and tell us how we got it all wrong.

Political manoeuvres in the dark

This is president Gustavo Petro’s final full year in power. Due to term limits in the Colombian system, the final six months of an administration often ends up as somewhat of a lame duck affair. If Petro can’t get something through before Christmas, it’s likely never happening.

More pertinently, he has to get a budget approved and that’s not going to be easy. He wants a tax reform, and those haven’t been easy to get through in recent years. Few people like paying tax at the best of times and in a cost of living crisis even less so.

Towards the end of the year, the riders and runners for the 2026 elections will become clearer as candidates jockey for position. There are a few hats in the ring already, but more will come thick and fast around autumn time. For a country that has never had a female head of state, there are a few intriguing names bouncing around.

It’s common for candidates to represent a range of parties, which involves a sort of primary process. Those usually take place in December or early January, meaning campaigns will be in full flow well before year end. 

Former Bogotá mayor Claudia López has expressed interest in running for the big office, as most ex-mayors do. The current mayor’s brother, Juan Manuel Galán also appears to be in the mix. Peñalosa might have another go and Fajardo probably isn’t done yet.

Vice president Francia Márquez may take a tilt, although she’s had a rough time as VP. Gustavo Petro’s wife Verónica Alcocer’s name has been mentioned, but that’s starting to die down a bit now as she has taken a back seat in recent months. Gustavo Bolívar recently finished third in a two horse race for the mayorship of Bogotá, but that hasn’t daunted him. 

Luis Gilberto Murillo resigned as canciller recently, which almost certainly means he’s going to enter the race. A highly able politician, he has generally done a good job on foreign affairs in the shadow of Petro and was seen as a safe pair of hands. His replacement is the precocious Laura Sanabria, continuing her ascent through Colombian politics.

From the right, things are far less clear. The definite candidate so far is Vicky Dávila, editor of Semana. She seems to enjoy the support of Uribe, though is not an established political figure with a base and electoral machine. There’s often been talk of Maria Fernanda Cabal running, but it’s one of the few subjects she remains tight-lipped about.

Can Petro secure a legacy?

Quite apart from the start of the presidential election cycle will be the question of Petro’s legacy. He came into power promising much but has so far delivered little. The pressure is on this year to get something big passed – not only for his pride but also the success of leftist candidates to succeed him. He’s going to try health reform again, but that was effectively sunk last year.

It’s not clear what is achievable. Various bills he has proposed have run into holdups within the Senate and he seems unwilling and/or unable to negotiate or compromise in order to get them passed. With time running out, he may break the habit of a lifetime and bend.

On the international stage, there are likely to be further tensions with the Maduro regime in Venezuela. Ex presidents of Colombia Iván Duque and Álvaro Uribe have called for action after last year’s election, leading Caracas to respond angrily. Petro remains cautiously friendly but that doesn’t seem to get him anywhere.

Of course, the return of Trump has already blown apart US-Colombia relations, with a well-publicised spat between the two presidents that ended up with no real change in deportations and plenty of anti-Colombian feeling in the new administration. 

In the end, both sides claimed victory, one more convincingly than the other and the threat of sanctions remains. On top of that, hundreds of visa processes were affected, aid will likely be cut and military operations and collaboration are in tatters. There’s a lot of work on to restore good feelings and it’ll likely take the whole year or more.

Germany is currently reconsidering visa-free access for Colombians, following a spike in asylum claims in the country. That follows the UK, which abruptly revoked visa-free access for Colombians for the same reason last year.

Peace sells, but who’s buying?

The various peace processes are in serious risk of collapse this year, most notably with the ELN. After recent clashes, Petro’s gone as far as to declare a state of emergency in Catatumbo and thousands of people are fleeing the zone.

That’s unlikely to end quickly and even if it does, the effects will linger far longer. All those displaced people will have to rebuild their lives whether they decide to go back or not, extra taxes have been announced to support the effort and of course distrust on both sides will remain.

None of the other processes have gone well, with armed groups on the northern coast making no real progress and FARC dissidents running rings round the state negotiators. It’s been years now of broken promises and wasted time and there’s not much to suggest any of that changing in the short term.

However, there’s plenty of incentive to get things done, and it’s not unusual for acuerdos to come seemingly from thin air. The aforementioned political jockeying may focus a few minds and get people to a deal. After all, Petro is by far the most receptive president any of these groups are likely to deal with.

Local issues

Despite the beautiful sunny days, Bogotá life is a bit of a grind for many at the moment. Crime remains stubbornly high, the Metro works are making it harder to get around the city and water cuts are continuing. Mayor Galán had an OK first year, but has few big achievements to point at. This year he could do with a big win. 

Crime has been top of bogotanos’ concerns for a long while but the numbers remain stubbornly high. Few people believe the official figures, especially as homicides are up – now higher per capita than Medellín. This is one of those things that can burn slowly and suddenly explode – hopefully not this year. 

Trash, too, has been an ongoing problem since both Petro (then mayor) and Peñalosa encountered troubles with the system. Since then it’s been mainly ignored, but rats and other vermin are all over the city again now. With hot, dry day now the norm, this is in danger of becoming the new normal. 

Metro works are now in full flow ahead of the projected 2028 finish date. Closures of key Transmilenio stations are part of this process as many metro stations will be built above extant Transmi stations. That means you can expect even more disruption among the Caracas, both for public transportation and private cars.

There will certainly be a lot more noise about water, at least in the initial months. La Niña barely arrived last year and finished early. With limited rainfall well into the traditionally dry months of January and February, a lot hangs on the springtime rainy season. Until then, water rationing will continue and may intensify.

Although few are predicting a repeat of last year’s forest fires, that’s certainly far from impossible. Most of the same conditions are in place – extended dry weather, high daytime temperatures and careless people are all in abundance once again.

Worryingly, Petro’s on the warpath again. He spent a lot of time arguing with Claudia López, but has until now left Galán’s administration alone. Now though, he’s threatening to pull funding for the capital again, citing budget problems. Whether he’ll go through with it is unclear, but that won’t help matters.

That’s Entertainment

As ever, there’s a feast of capital entertainment in the months ahead. After the roaring success of last year’s event, Festival Estéreo Picnic will be out to solidify itself in the heart of the capital. Later in the year, Cordillera will fulfil a similar brief. Then there’s the various al Parques and plenty of big gigs coming to town.

Festival Estéreo Picnic has a strong lineup and is head and shoulders above the rest of the Bogotá entertainment offerings. Even if the eclectic selection of Tool and Timberlake, Rodrigo and Morissette are not your cup of tea, there’s cracking local talent early doors.

For one off gigs, Shakira is playing Campín in February which will be huge. Also in springtime is posh Geordie Sting and The Offspring, who absolutely levelled Estéreo Picnic last year. Armenian-American metal legends System Of A Down arrive in April and for heavy fans there’s also the Linkin Park tour.

Smaller (musically, although Kylie is coming too) acts you might want to check out include Colombian songstress Juliana, Basque punk polymath Fermin Muguruza and Valeria Castro. Latin legends abound, from Enrique Bunbury to Molotov via Grupo Niche and more. 

A sporting chance

This will be a fairly quiet year in sporting terms, it seems, with few big events in the calendar. There are no Olympics or World Cups to look forward to. Locally, the developing Tour Colombia has been cancelled and doesn’t currently look likely to return. The Copa América Femenina takes place in Ecuador and althouth the women’s game get less fanfare, they deliver results.

With seven out of 10 teams qualifying for the 2026 men’s World Cup, there’s little jeopardy for the impressive Colombian men’s team. However, they have a strong chance of getting a top seed if they continue to do well in the FIFA rankings. They’re currently 12th and both Uruguay and Germany are eminently catchable.

The women’s team, however, get the chance to go one better than last time and claim a first ever Copa América Femenina. Led by precociously talented wonderkid Linda Caicedo, las superpoderosas manage to punch above their weight with limited funding. That means a fighting chance of a glorious return from Ecuador, so keep an eye on them.

One thing that won’t be continuing in the capital is the Falcao-Millos love affair. While his time living the dream with los embajadores was relatively fruitful, he won’t be returning this year in a dispute over wages. 

It seems like a lifetime ago that we were talking of a golden age for Colombian cycling, and it’s entirely possible that there could be small reasons to celebrate in the summer. The likes of Quintana and Chaves are older now but could take a stage somewhere, whereas Dani Martínez shone last year and all eyes are on Egan Bernal’s comeback trail.

A year of waiting, or time for a surprise?

While it does seem like the sort of year that’s not going to go anywhere, there’s so many plates spinning in so many areas that it’s entirely possible something will arrive without warning. The trickier part is working out what that will be.

Obviously, it would be good for a breakthrough to come in one or more of the various peace talks, but that seems like one of the longer shots at this moment in time. The chance of Petro getting something substantive through parliament is also fairly unlikely.

There’s a better chance of heavy rains in April-May which could get the reservoirs full again and see the end of rationing. However, that’s still a way away and the signs in January haven’t been encouraging at all.

So in the end there’s always the chance that things will come out of left-field, much as the Petro-Trump spat did. More upheaval in foreign affairs is distinctly possible, and closer to home displeasure at general conditions and cost of living mean there’s the chance of civil unrest in the cities breaking out over some triggering event.

One thing is for sure: Colombia in 2025 is unlikely to be uneventful even if it doesn’t end up being a historic year. As ever, the country retains the ability to spring surprises and the news cycle will continue to run at a breakneck pace. Let’s hope it’s eventful in a good way.

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The report, which covers the period from March 27 to June 26, 2024, highlights the important measures taken by Petro’s government to liaise between different State and civil entities for the successful implementation of the peace agreement. 

However, the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia also noted how different sectors have been expressing progressively more divergent opinions about the social policies of the government, which “highlights the need for consensus and effort unification to overcome the persistent challenges in the consolidation of peace,” as per the report. 

Among relevant issues noted by the entity is President Petro’s signaling of three key aspects that have made the enforcement of the agreement difficult: 

1. The implementation of the integral rural land reform, 
2. The transformation of territories that have been heavily affected by conflict, 
3. The exposition of truthful accounts of what happened during the conflict. 

These points were also brought forward by President Petro during his intervention at the UN Security Council. “The rural reform was ignored. Of the three million hectares promised in the change of land tenancy, only 17,000 have been exchanged. My government has exchanged 183,000,” he stated. 

Additionally, the president affirmed that “the clarification of truth on the events that happened during the armed conflict has become fragmented in different tribunals: paramilitaries go to the Justice and Peace tribunals, FARC guerrilla members and militants go to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, but the real sources of violence go to ordinary justice processes.” 

Other notable advancements that the report noted include the first revision of the plan that guides public policy for the implementation of the Peace Process (Plan Marco de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz), and an emergency plan announced by the National Department of Planning and Peace Process Implementation to enforce the agreement’s goals. 

Additionally, the entity praised the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), Colombia’s transitional justice mechanism established in the 2016 Peace Process, for issuing its first sanctions in the case of kidnappings carried out by the FARC, and also lauded the government’s current peace talks with six illegal armed groups. 

Nonetheless, the document warned against political violence and tensions related to the JEP after the Comunes political party, which is composed of ex-FARC combatants, claimed that it had lost its focus after seven years in operation. 

On Tuesday, the Colombian government announced it would end a cease-fire with the largest faction of the FARC-EMC, a dissident rebel group which abandoned the original 2016 peace deal, putting further peace negotiations in jeopardy. A smaller faction of the group will remain in the cease-fire agreement with the government.

Statements at the Security Council 

In light of the report, the Security Council was joined by President Petro, Carlos Ruiz Massieu, Representative of the Secretary-General for Colombia, and Diego Tovar, ex-FARC combatant. 

Ruiz Massieu highlighted the courage demonstrated by former FARC combatants for laying down their weapons and reintegrating into society and political life. However, he also observed that the main challenge lies on the sustainability of such reintegration. 

“The implementation of the agreement must go hand-in-hand with complementary strategies to deactivate persistent violence. Communities require the implementation of security guarantees foreseen in the agreement in a context of increased State presence, complemented by violence reduction measures,” Ruiz Massieu stated. 

The representative also spoke directly to President Petro, stating that the absence of violence in territories affected by the armed conflict was brief following the signing of the accords, and that the expansion of other armed groups further hindered the conflict dynamics in those areas. 

“Insecurity is, clearly, the main obstacle to reintegration and to the success of the Peace Process. Since the signing of the agreement, 421 signatories have been killed,” the representative warned.

Another important moment in proceedings was the speech delivered by Tovar, who signed the Peace Agreement in 2016 and was previously known by his nom de guerre Federico Montes, according to the Colombian Truth Commission. This marked the first time that a former FARC member attended a Security Council meeting in-person. 

“Mr. President, violence in the territories continues destroying the lives of entire communities, and limiting the authority of the present institutions to comply with their responsibilities,” Tovar stated.

According to the ex-combatant, the signatories’ current concern is the level of violence that former FARC members face when reintegrating into society, and the impunity levels they face when these cases are investigated by ordinary justice mechanisms. 

“The State must comply with their obligations to the women and men who laid down their weapons in a negotiated solution after decades of war, wanting to work towards peace” Tovar insisted. 

As a response, President Petro stated that there has not been an expansion of violence in Colombia. Rather, violence has been more and more geographically contained to the zones most affected by the previous conflict with the FARC. 

He also claimed that his government has made the most advances in favor of the agreement, and announced he would propose a fast-track measure to Colombia’s Congress to approve laws that would allow for the swift implementation of the peace deal. 

“We must now present changes in law that allow for the products of the Peace Agreement. Namely, integrated rural reform, a health plan, a housing plan, comprehensive and unfragmented truth, and the integration of territories into national development,” the President stated. 

President Petro also presented eight points for the improvement of the agreement’s implementation: 

1. Finance territorial inclusion in development, prioritizing the investment in war-torn territories, 
2. Change in the distribution of the General Participation System to allow directing resources to these territories. This would allow funding of their healthcare, education, infrastructure and investment projects,
3. Release the coca leaf-producing farmers from prison,
4. Optimization and new mandatory investments aimed at the productive substitution of illicit economies and a path to agro-industrialization,
5. Creation of a figure of hereditary familial concession in the jungle regions of Colombia,
6. Agrarian reform that includes the modification of current legislations for the express administrative purchase of land, in addition to the transformation of the National Land Agency into a project-structured entity with access to credit and a formalization of titles with special mechanisms,
7. A unified system of truth, justice, reparation and reconciliation for all conflict actors,
8. Extend the implementation period of the agreement by an additional seven years. 

The president finished his discourse by proposing that the members of the Council finance the implementation of the agreement through a method that would help mitigate the debt risk of the Colombian government. 

“How can the Peace Agreement be fulfilled if the Colombian government faces budgetary strangulation? My proposal is not a request for individual countries … it is to enhance the financial capacity of the Colombian State,” he proposed. 

The Future of the Colombian Peace Agreement  

The Colombian government, led by then-President Juan Manuel Santos, started peace talks with the FARC-EP guerilla in 2012 after 48 years of on-going armed conflict, according to the Colombian Truth Commission. 

The Final Agreement for the Termination of Conflict was signed in Havana, Cuba in 2016, putting an end to the State’s war with the biggest illegal armed group of the country, as per the entity. 

With the agreement, FARC members promised to lay down their weapons and reintegrate into civil society, and the Colombian State established different transitional justice mechanisms in which victims, FARC ex-combatants, and members of the armed forces were to participate in, according to the agreement. 

The Rosario University of Colombia highlights six key issues which the Agreement seeks to resolve: comprehensive agrarian development policy, political participation, solution to drug trafficking, victims, an end to conflict and effective disarmament, and a ratification of the agreement. 

However, last week’s report to the United Nations highlights a need for cohesive governmental and inter-institutional action in order to comply with the Peace Process. Particularly, the integral rural reform has been lagging behind, although different strategies have been adopted to accelerate the land restitution process to victims. 

Furthermore, and as reiterated by both Ruiz Massieu and Tovar at the Security Council, the report notes that there has been growing discontent from demobilized FARC members and the representatives of the Comunes political party because of the government’s non-compliance with land restitution policies, violence and stigmatization. 

As per the document, “the situation could significantly improve with a quicker implementation of inter-institutional frameworks, public policies and processes of decision-making that are key to the protection and safety to the prioritized populations of the Final Agreement.”  

Nonetheless, the direct participation of victims in ongoing processes within the frameworks of the Peace Process were duly celebrated by the United Nations. 

“I am confident that the Government led by President Petro will lead a joint effort with all State entities to achieve its far-reaching goals. While this endeavor is essentially Colombian, the support of the international community and of this Council in particular, will continue to be of utmost importance,” stated representative Ruiz Massieu.

This article originally appeared on Latin America Reports and was republished with permission.

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The El Salado massacre has been described as one of the bloodiest and most atrocious of Colombia’s conflict. For four days in February 2000, 450 paramilitaries held the small town hostage. The members of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) tortured and raped the town’s inhabitants, killing at least 60 locals. According to the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, many of the 7,000 people who lived there have never returned.

El Salado has become a focal point for peace initiatives, such as the recent workshop held there by the Ministry of Education. However, those activities take place against a backdrop of violence. Rural peace remains elusive, at both a national and local level.

Peace education workshop

Last week, senior officials from the Ministry of Education (MoE) held a three-day peace education workshop and event of historical memory at the site of the El Salado massacre. Educators from Ibagué, Medellin and Valledupar also attended.

Read more: Rights group calls on Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to hold Colombia responsible for sexual violence in El Salado massacre

The event included artistic and cultural presentations, as well as discussions with social leader and documentary-maker, Soraya Bayuelo. Importantly, attendees met with victims of the 2000 massacre. The workshop represents an ongoing commitment to peace education and the continuation of a transnational peace project between Colombia and Japan. 

In 2019, Colombian educators joined a three-week training programme in Okinawa, Japan. The Colombian MoE and the Japan International Cooperation Agency sought to strengthen abilities for peace education, memory and reconciliation. Four years later, the peace education projects conceived in Okinawa were reviewed at El Salado and new plans laid. 

Peace education is under-resourced

The Ministry of Education’s recent workshop in El Salado is a powerful representation of the progress made towards peace in Colombia. But, under the surface, peace and peace education are falling short.

In spite of the 2016 peace agreement, armed groups continue to terrorise rural populations. As a 2021 report from the human rights advocacy group WOLA put it, “Implementing the accord has gone more poorly than anticipated, and opportunities to break the cycle of violence are evaporating.”

The Kroc Institute found as of November 2022, 51% of the 578 commitments had not yet been initiated or were at a minimum state of implementation. Peace education, like other commitments of the peace agreement, is incomplete and under-resourced. A source at the MoE told The Bogotá Post, that allocated funds are distributed by population, benefiting larger cities while leaving rural communities – most affected by the conflict – without. Further still, according to University of Manchester research, no assessment of the effectiveness of peace education has ever been undertaken by the MoE. 

The state of peace education lends credence to the charge that peace implementation is in crisis in Colombia. Those gaps are increasingly evident in the Montes de María, where El Salado is located. The region straddles the northern departments of ​​Sucre and Bolivar in northern Colombia. Both departments have – and continue to – suffer high levels of violence. 

The Colombian ombudsman has issued several warnings about the heavy presence of armed groups in the region. The demobilisation of the FARC left a power vacuum that has been filled by armed gangs in various parts of the country. Montes de María has historic value to these groups as it is a place where they can cultivate and traffic drugs. With the traffickers, the violence follows. 

It isn’t easy to build peace, especially in areas where coca cultivation is so entrenched. It involves establishing a state presence, building infrastructure, as well as reconciliation and education activities. The government has historically been more concerned with disarmament than with implementing structural reforms that might address the socio-economic and political problems that lie at the heart of the violence. 

There’s no clearer evidence of this than the Kroc Institute’s analysis of the implementation of the peace agreement. The completion of rural reform commitments made in the agreement stands at an underwhelming 21%, in comparison to a 70% completion or partial completion of commitments around implementation, verification, and endorsement. The failure to materialise reforms leaves rural communities overlooked by the government and vulnerable to violence. 

To teach a peace education that contextualises the causes of violence without addressing the material conditions of its citizens makes peace education in Colombia at best, paradoxical, and at worst, insincere. How can peace be effectively taught while violence thrives?

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A Colombian human rights group is calling on the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) to hold the Colombian state responsible for acts of sexual violence which occurred during the February 2000 massacre in El Salado, in northern Colombia, carried out by paramilitary death squads.

In 2019, a Colombian court ruled that the armed forces, including the Navy and National Police, failed to act to prevent the massacre of 60 residents of El Salado. Despite reportedly being just miles away from where the atrocities took place.

According to NGO Sisma Mujer, while the Colombian state has been convicted for their role in the massacre, “none of the pronouncements have mentioned sexual violence.” 

Sisma Mujer said that this isn’t because cases of sexual violence during the massacre don’t exist. Rather it says, “the State never gave women the spaces, protection and guarantees so that they could report the facts safely, not only in physical terms but also emotionally.”

There have been eight documented cases of rape or sexual abuse that happened during the El Salado massacre — five of which involved minors — according to the NGO, and Sisma Mujer said there are more, but women are afraid to come forward out of fear for their safety. 

One of the alleged victims who has denounced crimes, Yirley Velasco, had her house in El Salado burned down last year. In 2020, the IACHR granted security measures to Velasco and her family related to her work as a social leader and human rights defender. 

Torture and execution in El Salado

On February 16, 2000, hundreds of members of the now defunct right-wing paramilitary group United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) marched into the small town of El Salado, about a three-hour drive inland from the coastal city of Cartagena. 

They set up chairs on the town’s concrete soccer field, and for six days, called up residents one by one to be interrogated, according to survivors who spoke to The New York Times at the time. 

Town residents the paramilitaries deemed to have collaborated with left-wing guerilla groups the AUC was fighting were tortured and executed. Musicians were forced to play for the troops, and they raided local beer and liquor supplies, turning the multi-day massacre into a brouhaha of blood and booze. 

Women and young girls were also repeatedly raped and abused. 

“I was a victim of sexual violence in the El Salado massacre, in El Carmen de Bolívar, on February 18, 2000. When I was 14 years old, many paramilitaries raped me. I have a daughter, who I think knows more than she lets on. They tortured me, they marked me; my mother witnessed everything they did to me. She was there. I felt so guilty that I was not able to look her in the eyes. I tried to take my life several times; then I isolated myself completely to raise my daughter; I didn’t want to live, because I didn’t see the value in life at that time. I have always said that they killed me on February 18, but only that day, because now I am alive, and despite so many circumstances, I am fighting. But, from there, from that ugly moment that I lived, my ordeal began, but my fight also began.”

Yirley Velasco, survivor and social leader. 

The Colombian armed forces were convicted of failing to prevent or stop the six-day massacre. Witnesses claimed that military and police units a few miles away failed to act, and even prevented human rights groups and relief workers from entering the area. At one point, The Times wrote, an injured paramilitary was even flown out in a helicopter.

The document submitted by Sisma Mujer to the IACHR urges the commission to not only recognize and declare the Colombian State responsible for the acts of sexual violence, but to also recognize the impact this sexual violence, physical violence and forced displacement has had on women and their families. The NGO says this aspect hasn’t been addressed by Colobmia’s justice system. 

After the massacre, El Salado became a ghost town, with most of its 7,000 residents fleeing to other parts of Colombia. It wasn’t until 2015 that family members were fully able to come together and mourn their loved ones, who were buried in a nearby mass grave.

In addition to the Colombian State, authorities have implicated John Jairo “El Tigre” Esquivel, the former commander of the Northern Bloc (Bloque Norte) of the AUC, for directing the massacre. He was captured in 2019. 

Also, in testimony from 2007, extradited paramilitary leader Salvatore Mancuso admitted to playing a part in the massacre. He was released from a US prison in 2020 and was recently appointed as a “peace manager” by President Gustavo Petro for negotiations with armed groups.

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Deep in the hills of northern Antioquia, a co-operative of former guerrilla fighters is stitching together a new reality – quite literally.  Following the signing of the peace treaty in 2016, the group swapped guns for sewing machines. Since then, their brand, La Montaña, has gained traction in Colombia and abroad. 

The process of reintegration for many former FARC fighters has not been easy. As a Crisis Group report on the fifth anniversary of the peace agreement explains, “Setbacks to reforms, former guerrillas’ stigmatisation and the murders of hundreds of ex-FARC discredit the 2016 peace deal in the countryside.” 

Many ex-combatants have created their own businesses as part of the transition, with projects as diverse as brewing craft beer and making dolls. Tourism-wise, former guerillas have turned their hands to guiding, running bird-watching, hiking, and river rafting excursions. 

La Montaña is just one of more than 4,200 of proyectos productivos in Colombia. Its 24 staff manufacture backpacks, clothes, hammocks, and money belts in the name of peace.

Sewing for survival 

“We started thinking about alternatives for survival”, explains Guillermo León Chanci, a former FARC commander and one of the founders of La Montaña. “We thought, if sewing served for war, why doesn’t [it] serve for peace?” 

I meet Chanci, or as he was known during the conflict, ‘Leónidas’, in la Casa la Roja on Calle 45, a cultural centre run by ex-FARC members and a key stockist of La Montaña products. He is on a flying visit to Bogotá from La Plancha, an AETCR (Antiguo Territorial Space for Training and Reincorporation) in the municipality of Anorí, which is currently home to around 155 ex-combatants and their families.

During the conflict, La Plancha served as a base for the 36th Front of the FARC. Fed up with ill-fitting and inadequate uniforms, the guerillas set up a workshop on the site to create their own supplies. So when it came to considering new ways of supporting the community, it seemed natural to convert these wartime survival skills into the tools of peacetime prosperity. 

At first, the residents of La Plancha were just creating items for residents of neighbouring communities, but seeing a potential business opportunity, the community invested COP$8 million of government funding into the project. It has now expanded to include a honey business and a women-led line of plant-based skin products. 

La Montaña has become so successful they supply stores in Medellín and Bogotá and even have European buyers. “We reimbursed the contribution the government put in and from there, we are advancing. We’ve managed to achieve commercial status,” Chanci tells us, pride radiating in every syllable. “About three months ago, we sent 100 bags to Spain.” 

Tourists often visit Anorí and the workers of La Montaña. Chanci hopes the products they buy and take back to their home countries can act as adverts for the changes communities like La Plancha are trying to bring to the country and in doing so create yet more economic opportunities. 

Broken promises 

Whilst projects like La Montaña have helped transform the future for demobilised fighters, the community has faced significant challenges according to Chanci. 

He first moved to Anori in 2014 to help to carry out peace education there, but from the off encountered issues. “It was difficult: Firstly because [we were] uprooting a custom, a culture that we had had and adapting ourselves to another,” he explains. “But it was more difficult when we started to discover the government’s lack of willingness to fulfil the [peace] treaty.” 

Rural reform and redistribution of land constitute the first point of the 2016 peace deal and the government committed to improving land access and reducing rural poverty and food insecurity. The terms of the treaty set out that the state is expected to allocate up to three million hectares of land to landless campesinos and those with limited access. However, a 2022 study by Colombia’s attorney general found that just 16% of this land allocation had been completed. The state has also fallen short on targets to formalise land rights and on development goals in recent years. 

The slowness of the government to apportion land has been particularly problematic for members of demobilised communities and their ability to carry out proyectos productivos. The original ETCRs were created as a temporary measure as part of the peace process, but seven years later many communities are still living in semi-permanent settlements and waiting for new land. 

When the legal provision for the ETCRS expired in 2019, Duque’s government announced that some of the settlements would become permanent, but others would be relocated. At the time La Plancha was not designated for relocation, but this was later changed and the ex-guerrilleros have been waiting for years to be relocated. 

“The housing and the construction and the structure aren’t adequate because the camp zones were for six months”, Guillermo explains in reference to living conditions at La Plancha. “The community is willing to relocate the ETCR to somewhere where housing can be built, because we cannot build housing here.” The ETCR has 19 lodgings, a sick-bay, library and football pitch, but lacks an aqueduct and connectivity. 

In February 2022 the government allocated 100 hectares of land to proyectos productivos in Antioquia. Over half this land is located in the municipality of Anorí. According to the head of the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalisation, Andrés Felipe Stapper Segrera, preliminary studies were started to determine the feasibility of moving La Plancha to the newly acquired land, but more than a year on the community is yet to be relcoated. 

“The slowness affects us because we cannot create our proyectos de vida,” Chanci adds, explaining that in order to create new lives demobilised FARC members require “decent housing and land to work and support [their] projects.”

Fresh government, fresh hope

For Chanci, the premiership of Petro after years of right-wing governments, offers hope that the years of government lethargy will finally come to an end. “For us, it was a joy,” he explains, recollecting the election of the former M-19 member’s election as President last year. “However many difficulties we have, we can overcome them with this government.” 

According to Chanci, they are already seeing progress. “With Petro’s government we have advanced with point one, Petro is apportioning land to the campesino, but we are also advancing with the implementation of the PDETs (Planes de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial)”. 

“We are thinking about sitting and discussing once again the topic of substitution of [illegal] crops, […] we’re discussing the topic of housing for signatories of the peace agreement.”

In October last year, Petro’s government signed an agreement to facilitate the purchase of 3 million hectares of land in order to fulfil the requirements for land distribution under the 2016 agreement. His administration has also made progress on the issue of formalising land rights. 

A lifelong battle 

Despite the progress being made, Chanci is pragmatic in his expectations for the current government. “We know that we can’t achieve all the goals we have with Petro, if we want to advance, four years isn’t going to be enough,” he said.

Chanci knows better than most that change takes time – he first became involved with left-wing movements at the age of 12, joining the Colombian Communist party before eventually being swept up in the optimism of the Union Patriotica (UP) in 1984. The UP promised land reform, nationalisation of key natural resources and a new economic model for the country. But hope soon turned to despair as the government, military and paramilitary groups systematically wiped out the UP, killing at least 6,000 people, including two presidential candidates, five congressmen and 109 councillors.  

It was this violence and the despair it created that drove Chanci and many others to join the FARC. “We didn’t know any other route except the armed option and we went to the guerrilla because there was no other route, because the flags that we were defending, those of the Colombian Communist Party and the Unión Patriótica, were snatched away,” he said.

But now the political route is back on the table. Combined with the opportunities provided by proyectos productivos like La Montaña, it means there are other avenues for progress for these communities. 

If Colombia can create a “durable peace” through the full implementation of the 2016 treaty and in doing so build trust in the international community sufficiently to expand the potential of tourism, the future is bright according to Chanci. After all: “Colombia in peace? You never have to go to a European nation, this is paradise.” 

La Montaña products can be bought in La Trocha and La Casa La Roja in Bogotá or online.

In addition to backpacks and clothing, La Plancha’s community also produces honey and plant-based skincare and hygiene items. 

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Colombia’s peace courts heard testimony this week from feared paramilitary leader Salvatore Mancuso. 

“You’ve been invited to the finca for Sunday lunch,” a friend told me in Montería, a small sweltering city at the heart of Colombia’s coastal cattle country.

It’s a common enough invitation in a region where many middle-class people have a small farm with cattle, chicken, plantain and yams.

But this invitation came with a catch. This was Salvatore Mancuso’s farm, the military chief of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, or AUC, as they wrote their initials, frequently in blood painted on the adobe walls of the trashed houses of their victims, those lying nearby with their hands tied behind their backs and their head caved in with hammers.

Also to attend was Carlos Castaño, the AUC’s ultimate jefe, a ranting right-wing demagogue from a cartel family who had somehow melded Colombia’s disperse paramilitary groups – with considerable state assistance – into a cohesive counterforce to left-wing guerrillas.

That was back in 2002.

The autodefensa moniker was off mark. Yes, sometimes they did battle guerrillas such the FARC and ELN. But more often, they tortured and killed campesinos eking a living in Córdoba’s tropical savannas.

And over time their activities extended far beyond the Atlantic coast. Abetted by state military logistics and air transport, Mancuso’s paras sowed terror all over rural Colombia. They constructed crematoriums to incinerate 500 people in Norte de Santander, and hung 30 civilian suspects alive from meat-hooks in an abattoir in Mapiripán, Guaviare, before disembowelling them with chainsaws.

Chainsaws and chopped noggins became the calling cards for the AUC – locals referred to them simply as mochecabezas, or “head-cutters.”

I turned down the lunch invite, I had other plans.

Seeing Mancuso pop up on TV screens this week brought back this memory and many more. The former AUC leader is currently jailed in Atlanta, USA, but testified by video-link to the Colombian peace courts.

This is the old warrior’s last throw of the dice to see if his crimes can be fitted into the framework of La Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) which could bring him benefits. He is in legal limbo right now, still imprisoned on drug charges, but facing justice for many more crimes.

Fittingly, the four-day JEP hearings were held in Monteria, Córdoba, where Mancuso was born to an Italian immigrant father and a local mother. Two decades ago he was hated, loved, and feared in equal measure in the city.

A legend is born

For rich cattle farmers constantly extorted by rag-tag guerrillas, the engineer-farmer was a legendary leader who fought back and wasn’t scared to blood himself in battle.

According to local folklore, Triple Zero (as Mancuso was known) was the fantasma who could lead moonlight raids to outwit the wily guerrillas, then pop up smartly dressed in Montería high society or win a medal at the Sunday shooting competition.

In the veredas of Cordobá – where everyone swaps stories, but few read newspapers – even his haters were agog with his exploits. These include piloting a helicopter to rescue his boss, Castaño, from a FARC ambush close to their farm base in Tierralta, in the jungles of the Nudo Paramillo.

It was during those years, from 2000 to 2004, that I walked or rode mules over the same trails as Mancuso, into the Nudo Paramillo, or by canoe to the indigenous villages of the Rio Alto Sinú, or the ghost towns of the Rio Verde where Mancuso’s men had lined up a dozen local traders – accusing them of selling goods to the FARC – and put a bullet in each one’s head.

Some of the worst peasant massacres happened further north, in towns close to the canyons of the Montes de Maria – temporary forts for FARC, ELN and ERP guerrillas. Some were erased off the map in events that saw 350 villagers murdered in 45 attacks in just three years.

It was after one of those, in El Salado, that I saw the letters AUC scrawled in blood on the walls of abandoned houses. The once-bustling town was stripped bare to its door-frames, part of a hardware booty taken by the large paramilitary force (450 heavily armed men and women) to resell or use on their own farms.

The El Salado massacre was marked by its medieval brutality, a three-day drunken festival of torture, rape and killings of 60 innocent townsfolk to a vallenato soundtrack. People were murdered for owning a car or having a leg of beef in their house, while the Colombian army stood guard and Mancuso flew in by helicopter to survey the damage.

The details are Dantean: Pregnant women impaled with sticks. Old people forced to dance, then beaten to death. Body parts cut from living victims.

Last year, in a separate testimony Mancuso addressed some 400 survivors of El Salado, again by video-link: “Today, sorry for all the damage I have caused you, I am responsible for the tragedy you and your families and loved ones suffered. Sorry from the depths of my heart, a thousand times sorry…”

Key question for the Peace Courts: Can such crimes ever be forgiven? And should they?

It’s a question central to the current peace process, and instructive to any future ones. As Colombia’s cycles of conflict roll on, and today’s perpetrators – the direct descendants of the AUC and FARC – commit their own atrocities, they would be wise to heed the words of my Yorkshire granny: “Truth will out.”

But is it the whole truth? That’s a key question for the JEP during their public cross-examination of Mancuso this week.

The man himself has softened over the years, now resembling a Costeño Santa Claus with jowls and a white beard and seems at ease recounting his side of the story. But it’s not entirely clear what’s driving Mancuso. Legal benefits? Genuine contrition?  

Or is he out for revenge on his former political masters?

Mancuso demobilised along with the AUC in 2006 but was suddenly extradited to a US jail two years later after his too-public comments on links between the AUC, the military, and the then Álvaro Uribe government.

The paramilitary peace process, started in 2004, mostly served to cut visible links between the AUC and political-military chiefs. That the para leaders might actually repent – and point the finger at their former puppet-masters – was never part of the deal. And who knows where the truth trail might lead since Colombia’s US backers were also in the know.

To everyone’s surprise – and anger from victims’ groups needing answers for the killed and disappeared in Colombia – the Uribe government spirited 14 AUC leaders to US jails on “drugs charges.” As if sending drugs to the US is so much more of a crime than killing thousands of Colombians…

But now Mancuso’s back, with a vengeance, and – maybe – naming names.

Of course, it’s not new that the AUC worked in lockstep with Colombia’s military and politicians. It’s the “who, what, where, when” that the JEP wants to hear.  And how it might help victims. One of the key questions – literally – is, “Where are the bodies buried?”

What have we learned so far?

According to his testimony this week, the AUC backed various former presidential candidates (call it bet spreading) such as Horacio Serpa, Andrés Pastrana, and Álvaro Uribe. Furthermore, Uribe, said Mancuso, had orchestrated the removal of security guards from a local politician so the AUC could kill him.

Pastrana and Uribe hit back this week on Twitter. Pastrana labelled Mancuso a “cowardly killer.” Uribe also used the word coward and threatened legal action.

Further information from Mancuso – but again not completely new – was on the tight links between Colombia’s state intelligence service (DAS) and the AUC. The para chief described his own role as la bisagra – “the hinge” – between the state military and the paramilitaries.

Mancuso’s testimony also highlighted the close logistic support that the Colombian state military gave the AUC, in the form of weapons, transport, and monthly multi-million payments from drinks companies like Postobon and Bavaria.

He also said there was also tactical support from the Colombian military. The local army and marines were purposefully distracted to investigate “missing cows” by local rancher-politicians, even as the AUC raped and strangled women in El Salado. Then, when they were “alerted,” state forces held back for three days so the paramilitaries could finish the job.

These joint operations happened at a national level, admitted Mancuso: “Everywhere we operated, it was done in the same way,” he told the JEP magistrates. “Between all of us, we called each other ‘cousins’ because we were one family. We were allies in a fight against the internal enemy: the guerrillas.”

But this noble “band of brothers” narrative – united to fight an insurrection – wears thin when you consider the horrific AUC attacks against civilians and non-combatants, such as in El Salado. The list of victims is endless.

Killing a comedian

Under tutelage of DAS, the AUC murdered dozens of university lecturers and professors signalled as being “left-wing”, as well as the comedian Jaime Garzon, among many others. In fact, the DAS chiefs, as well as financially supporting the paramilitaries, would hand over intelligence files and “kill lists.”

“DAS handed over privileged information to the paramilitaries, which allowed them to persecute those they considered an obstacle to their military, social, economic, and political objectives,” Mancuso explained.

This policy led to hundreds of deaths of innocent persons whose work took them close to conflict areas, such as Mario Calderón and Elsa Alvarado who were gunned down with state complicity in their flat in Chapinero, Bogotá in 1997.

Both were NGO workers visiting the Sumapaz region south of Bogotá where guerrillas also roamed, and had been stopped by an army patrol – and their names and addresses taken – the week before their deaths.

And according to the former AUC chief this week, DAS had also declared Gustavo Petro and Álvaro Leyva (the current president and chancellor) as “military targets.”

“That inclination to the left labelled people as subversive,” explained Mancuso. 

But politics wasn’t enough; this week Mancuso also recognised AUC involvement in the state military “falsos positivos” practices. He said paramilitaries would supply the army with the corpses of innocents that the Army passed off as guerrillas so troops could get bonuses.

“They handed us lists and then we hit houses and killed those who we later claimed to be guerrillas,” Mancuso said.

Two warnings – and one death

Eventually, the AUC spread their deadly nets to trap anyone perceived as a threat. This included the gruesome murders of state investigators, some from the CTI, Cuerpo Técnico de Investigaciones, sent to investigate paramilitary activities. We now know that some state technocrats tipped off the AUC to murder their own colleagues.

Then came Limpieza Social (social cleaning), an intersection of small-town conservatism, control by cocaine cartels, frustrated cattle ranchers and Catholicism. The AUC could kill you for your lifestyle.

Mancuso told this week how the paramilitaries targeted people because of their gender identity or for using drugs. Any non-conformist activity – such as young people’s tattoos and body art – was at risk, all part of the AUC strategy to exercise control over a cowed population.

Usually, people were warned twice before being killed once. This, at least in Monteria, was the AUC code, when I lived there in 2001: “You wear a belly button ring? Get out of town.” “Shave off your beard. Or get out of town. Or die.” Bought a nice Che Guevara T-shirt? “Leave or die.”

I once got “warned” for playing Led Zeppelin on my stereo. “We recommend not to play unapproved music” came a message via a colleague. Even salsa was frowned upon, and bars opted for non-stop accordion music even while the paramilitaries were harbouring fugitive vallenato legend Diomedes Díaz (he was accused of murdering his girlfriend).  

The songs sung in Monteria this week were from the AUC’s victims. Along with poems, paintings and some video interludes, a small sample of the multitude of AUC victims were heard at the JEP – but only briefly as time was reserved mostly for Mancuso’s interrogation and testimony.

The final word, though, and perhaps the most impacting, came from Aura Camargo. Her video address to Mancuso (who looked sad and attentive during the presentation) went directly to the heart of conflict.

Who gave the orders?

More than the killings – Camargo lost several close family members – was the AUC’s destruction of the rich fabric of cultural, economic, and social life in the region; widespread rape and sexual abuse – Camargo herself was a victim – and the breakdown of family bonds.

“Mister Mancuso, what did we do to deserve this war which broke our communities?” she asked.

Now is the time, she said, to unmask the powerful political and business interests behind the land grabs and monoculture – and destruction of local agriculture – that underpinned the paramilitary project. A war nominally against insurgents by waged against the campo and the campesinos.

For Camargo, and many other victims, the twist in the tale is that their former nemesis, Salvatore Mancuso, is now their hope. But only if he is allowed to continue under the JEP and tell the full story. We should know within two months.

“There is no future without truth. We need to know who gave the orders?” said Camargo. Maybe, at last, Colombia will find out.

The post Going Local: Salvatore Mancuso – Truth Will Out appeared first on The Bogotá Post.

Call it an Easter surprise: shortly after Colombia’s holiest week, semana santa, a top FARC dissident guerrilla appears before a huge crowd of followers in rural Caquetá to talk peace on behalf of the country’s second largest armed group.

Nestor Gregorio Vera Fernández, better known as Iván Mordisco, represents the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) which oversees 3,400 dissident fighters of the FARC-EP divided in 23 fronts over half of Colombia.

The catch is that Mordisco was supposed to be dead, as announced with great fanfare by former president Iván Duque in July last year. 

The Frente 1 leader – who had led nearly 400 guerrilla fighters back to the bush after rejecting a peace agreement in 2016 – was “brought down in a firefight with army special forces”.  

Except he wasn’t. And nine months later Mordisco´s resurrection is a poke in the eye for both past and present political establishments.

First up in the embarrassment stakes is President Petro, who since January has maintained a shaky ceasefire between numerous armed groups and state forces as a prelude to his ambitious Total Peace plan.

Appearances matter

This ceasefire created conditions for the Caquetá gathering, but not as Petro planned: Mordisco was supposed to appear unarmed and in civilian clothes to mingle with government commissioners and foreign ambassadors, all the better to underline an end to conflict.

FARC flipped the script: Mordisco’s Estado Mayor Central went full fariana with military regalia, insignia, banners, salutes, and revolutionary hymns against a backdrop of flag-waving campesinos and indigenous guards shipped in from all over Colombia. To save face, Petro’s team stayed away.

And Mordisco clearly didn’t get the “no guns” memo. Escorted by an armed squadron of uniformed bodyguards, he personally sported a modern Tar-21 assault rifle with a telescopic night-sight, leading many to draw parallels with the failed negotiations at the turn of the century.

This choice of gun caused quite a ripple in Colombian commentators more used to the rusty AK-47s shouldered by the old FARC. Mordisco’s US$2,000 deadly Israeli adornment seemed somehow to clash with his anti-capitalist invective and proposals for peace.

“We are ready to start talks…with the hope that these lead to elements that contribute to overcome the conditions that have created the armed conflict,” Mordisco announced to the crowd.

Which begs the question: why didn’t Mordisco lay down arms in 2016?

Mordisco was the original hold-out against the historic peace process between former president Juan Manuel Santos – he won a Nobel peace prize for his efforts – and the FARC-EP guerrilla group, or the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia – Ejercito del Pueblo to give them their full name.

Mordisco and fellow FARC commander Gentil Duarte distrusted Santos’s peace partly because of state trickery during previous peace cycles, such as the extermination of the FARC-sponsored Union Patriotica party in the 1980s.

But their act of dissidence also triggered a self-fulfilling tragedy as the renegade FARC units fed public doubt in the peace process. Santos’s accord was publicly rejected by a small majority in a national referendum in October, 2016.

This in turn emboldened his presidential successor, Iván Duque, to unpick the agreements leading to a security crisis for majority of the FARC who had demobilised: in the six years since more than 350 former fighters have been assassinated, and many aspects of the 2016 Peace Agreement are still unfulfilled.

To further undermine the former peace process, the  FARC EMC declared in Caquetá last week that they were not dissidents at all because “the peace process never existed”, as a young commander Andrey Avendaño told gathered journalists.

This statement caused some indignation among seasoned conflict commentators: if the FARC are themselves declaring the last plan a hoax, why should anyone back a new one?

And to add fuel to the fire, Avandaño claimed that, yes, he personally had signed the Santos Peace Agreement “as an opportunity to get out of jail” in 2018. He then went back to the fight.

Who should benefit from peace?

This highlights a legal and moral wrangle which shadows Petro’s Total Peace plan: can former demobilised fighters who re-joined armed groups be given a second bite of the apple?

Perhaps it is this dilemma that leads the FARC EMC to emphasise its “true FARC” title – and to show up to peace talks suited, booted and heavily armed – and simultaneously to rubbish the previous Peace Agreement.

The last is a low blow to their former comrades who did demobilise. And it’s often the same dissident FARC fighters who are killing their demobilised former comrades.  

Understandably the peaceful political projects of the former FARC – such as the Partido Comunes  – have been cautious in welcoming Paz Total and any deal with the dissidents, mindful of how it might affect the precarious situation of those who sought peace in 2016

“Any agreement between the government and these organisations should not be detrimental to those already made between the FARC-EP and Colombian state,” Comunes spokesman Julián Gallo told Red Noticias after the appearance of Mordisco in Caquetá.

Another issue is that the FARC EMC is failing to comply with the current ceasefire, according to Indepaz, a conflict think tank based in Bogotá.

Even while talking peace, the FARC EMC are currently entangled in a struggle for the cocaine trade with the Segunda Marquetalia, led by former FARC leader Iván Márquez, who with several high-level commanders abandoned the current peace process in 2019 and created another alternative FARC group.

This conflict between two powerful former FARC groups has sown terror and confusion among civilian communities in the flashpoint departments of Putumayo and Nariño, not least because campesinos can’t differentiate between two similar groups expounding the same ideology – and carrying banners of the same dead leaders – while being implacably opposed.

Peace sells, but who’s buying?

Segunda Marquetalia is also negotiating to enter to Petro’s Total Peace plan along with powerful armed groups the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)  and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC).

If it sounds complicated, well, it is. In recent history every Colombian president has laid out their peace plan as soon as entering office. But most aim to tackle just one insurgency, usually without success.

Petro’s “everyone-everywhere-all-at-once” plan of  Paz Total  is seen as over-ambitious. Since the ceasefire announced in January – which is mostly observed just by state forces – many rural communities have seen increased conflict as irregular armed groups fight over territorial voids. ELN especially have made a point of ignoring the ceasefire.

Petro’s shotgun approach may seem quixotic, but is likely an attempt to address the reality that most Colombian conflict is multifaceted. Most impact on civilians stems from combat between irregular armed groups, rather than direct insurrection with the state. There is an argument that peace can only involve everyone.

This realpolitik requires a fudge in categorising armed groups as ‘ideological’ or ‘criminal’, and some leniency towards combatants who demobilised then went back to arms. The question is how far Petro can push the political boundaries and keep public support.

Root and branch reform

Even within just one armed group there is much room for debate. The FARC, for example, is “like a big tree with a large trunk, and many branches,” explained Indepaz director Camillo Gonzalez after the Caquetá event.

“The tree trunk entered into an agreement in Havana and laid down arms. Some branches didn’t enter the accord, but they have the same roots,” said Gonzalez, referring to the dissidence branches. The problem now is Mordisco’s claim to the FARC trunk – and not the twig.  

This is disingenuous since the disidencia is today mostly young recruits who never knew the old FARC, or former combatants – like Avandaño – who signed the Santos peace deal then went back to fight.

Meanwhile the FARC EMC has aggressively expanded its trafficking routes – gold and cocaine – westward to the Pacific Coast, down to Ecuador and Peru, and eastward along the Orinoco to Venezuela’s Atlantic Coast where units with Colombian commanders patrol the river in speedboats and outgun the Venezuelan National Guard. 

These activities suggest a transnational crime group rather than an ideological entity worthy of a political olive branch. 

Even the ELN recently declared that it “does not recognize the (FARC) EMC as an autonomous and independent organization, but rather as a criminal organization”.

And for many Colombians, the doubt remains that such lucrative illegal enterprises, even with a political veneer, can genuinely shut down. The risk is a scam where senior commanders see Total Peace as an early retirement scheme while the young guns step up. 

Can Iván Mordisco turn this around? His unexpected appearance in Caquetá certainly made waves. But as the caravan of peace rolls on, he might want to rethink his image at the upcoming dialogue scheduled for May 16th.

And perhaps hang up his camouflage and Tor-21, and instead wear jeans and carry a notebook. That, though, would be a miracle.

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